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1. Introduction 
This is a boundary dispute. To hear those words, "a boundary dispute," is to fill a judge 
even of the most stalwart and amiable disposition with deep foreboding since disputes 
between neighbours tend always to compel, as this one did, some unreasonable and 
extravagant display of unneighbourly behaviour which profits no one but the lawyers. 
(Ward LJ: Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley [1998] 1 WLR 881 at 882) 
Boundary disputes are a particularly painful form of litigation. Feelings run high and 
disproportionate amounts of money are spent. Claims to small and valueless pieces of 
land are pressed with the zeal of Fortinbras's army. It is therefore important that the law 
on boundaries should be as clear as possible. 
(Lord Hoffman: Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley [1999] 1 WLR 894 at 895) 
By now most graduates have been introduced to the concept of cadastral reinstatement and 
the dominant role that the courts play in the determination of boundaries. The power to define 
boundaries rests with the courts, not the surveyor. The task of a surveyor is to describe the 
existing boundaries by collecting sufficient evidence and then interpreting the evidence in a 
way that is consistent with the precedent set by previous court decisions. In much the same 
way as Tolstoy described families, (All happy families are happy alike, all unhappy families 
are unhappy in their own way.) boundary surveys where the physical evidence fits the 
documentary evidence are all straightforward, but surveys where the physical evidence 
doesn’t fit are all different. This means rather than apply rote solutions learned by rote 
surveyors have to apply general principals, laid down by the courts, to arrive at the solutions 
that they think a court will most likely agree with them. 
2. Common law 
The common law (sometimes called case law) is the body of legal opinion that is built up 
over time derived from the decisions of judges. The vast majority of our law is statute law 
that is made by Parliament, but in some cases where this law is vague or imprecise, or this 
law conflicts with the requirements of Australia’s constitution the courts are asked to 
interpret what the statute law means in the particular facts of a dispute.  The court will give 
its decision as well as an explanation of how it came to make that decision. The common law 
works on the principle of stare decisis which is an abbreviation of a Latin dictum meaning 
“stand by the thing decided and do not alter that which has been established”. The society 
benefits from certainty in the law so little is to be gained from eternally arguing the same 
points. When it comes to precedent, courts are bound by decisions made by higher courts and 
generally by decisions made at their own level. An important distinction is always how 
closely the facts of the case being decided coincide with the facts of the previously decided 
case. In each decision there is always the key fact around which the decision was made. This 
is referred to as the ratio decidendi and is the binding part of the decision. From time to time 
the judges will make remarks in passing about the outcome of the case had some of the facts 
been different. These statements are referred to as obiter dicta. Obiter dicta statements are 
not binding but may be persuasive in lower courts.  
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Either because surveyors do a good job or the cost of going to court is so high in relation to 
the cost of land, there have not been a lot of cases relating to boundary reinstatement before 
the Australian and New Zealand courts. For that reason other cases in other jurisdictions that 
share Australia’s common law heritage such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the United 
States are often considered by Australian courts (Donaldson v. Hemmant (1901) 11 QLJ 35; 
Equitable Building and Investment Co. v Ross (1886) 5 NZLR SC 229) and Australian 
authorities (Brown (1980).  
3. Evidence 
When Bill Clinton campaigned against George Bush senior for the US presidency he had a 
sign in his office that read, “The economy, stupid”. A surveyor learning the principles of 
cadastral reinstatement would do well to hang a similar sign on their desk that says, “The 
evidence, stupid”. Your undergraduate study has covered the types of cadastral evidence and 
how surveyors go about collecting the evidence reliably.  The purpose of this paper is to give 
students and surveyors an understanding of the relative importance of different types of 
evidence. Traditionally the law looks at evidence in a purely practical way that appeals to the 
majority of surveyors: 
the judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule on 
evidence, the best that the nature of the law will allow. 
(Lord Hardwicke : Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21 at 49) 
If the evidence that is found is conflicting the unique skill of the cadastral surveyor is to rank 
it in the order of its quality. To do this surveyors bring to bear knowledge of historical 
marking and measuring techniques, an ability to reliably record the position of the evidence 
and experience in resolving contradictions. Over time there has evolved a general agreement 
over the relative worth of evidence types. This list is often called the hierarchy of evidence 
but perhaps is better described as a manual for reinstatement. Like all technical manuals it has 
the solution the majority of the time but sometimes better solutions might come if it is set 
aside.  
4. The hierarchy of evidence 
Most Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions refer to the concept of the hierarchy of 
evidence but neglect to commit themselves a particular list. In Queensland the legislation 
defines the hierarchy as: 
hierarchy of reinstatement evidence means a set of rules recognised in the surveying 
profession— 
 (a) for giving weight to evidence of cadastral boundaries; and 
 (b) used in the reinstatement of cadastral boundaries. 
(Surveying and Mapping Infrastructure Regulation 2004 (Qld), s. 11(3)) 
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This statement gives the surveyor the necessary flexibility, but is not particularly useful to the 
student of cadastral reinstatement. Most cadastral surveyors take this section as referring to 
the evidence hierarchy published by Alan Brown in 1980. 
1. The greatest weight must always be given to lines actually marked on the  
 ground. 
2. Next most important are natural monuments mentioned in the deed. 
3. Adjoiners – “a well established line of adjacent survey” – often rank as natural 
 monuments. 
4. Artificial monuments rank next. 
5. Maps or plans actually referred to in the deed rank after artificial monuments. 
6. Unmarked lines which are well recognised rank next to maps and plans in  
 importance. 
7. Bearings and distances will over-ride other calls only, in most cases, where  
 there is no trustworthy evidence of such other calls. 
8. As between bearing and distance, neither is given overall preference – if they  
 are inconsistent with each other the circumstances dictate which is preferred. 
9. Area … will in general be the least valued evidence, but may in some cases be  
 the key to the problem. 
10. Finally, but most important of all, any one of these rules may be of more (or less) 
 weight in one case than another. The rules set out are for cases of conflict, they  are 
general rules, to be used as a guide but not as a straightjacket.   
(Brown (1980) p 155) 
While the list detailed by Brown is correct with respect to the law it is not necessarily of great 
use to the surveyor. Australian and New Zealand surveyors that deal with a system of public 
recording of title boundary survey data under the Torrens Title legislation may wonder about 
the mention of deeds. They may ask how maps and plans can be separated from bearings and 
distances. They may wonder as how lines marked on the ground can be distinguished from 
artificial monuments. They may wonder where the evidence of occupation fit into the 
equation. This paper will attempt interpret the common law in light of the decisions that 
cadastral surveyors need to make about boundaries day in, day out.  
5. Intention 
Boundaries are legal objects that are created by individuals, corporations or governments and 
they come into being by an action. Before there can be an action there needs to be an 
intention to perform that action. Courts and legal texts have agreed that the intention needs to 
be the ‘expressed’ intention of the parties rather than what can be surmised.  
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The cardinal rule for the interpretation of deeds is to discover the expressed intention of 
the parties, gathered from all parts of the instrument, giving each word its due force read 
in light of existing conditions and circumstances at the time of the conveyance. It is the 
intention definitely expressed in the instrument that controls, not intention merely 
surmised. 
(Brown 1980, p. 150) 
…the location of a boundary is primarily governed by the expressed intention of the 
originating party or parties or, where the intention is uncertain by the behaviour of the 
parties. 
(Hallmann 1973, p. 175) 
Therefore one of the keys to ascertaining the intention of the parties is resolving how it was 
expressed in the actions of the parties. In Pukallus v Cameron (1982) 180 CLR 447 the 
parties entered into a contract to sell a lot with both parties under the misapprehension that a 
bore and area of cultivation was within the boundaries of the lot. They contracted to buy and 
sell the lot without any mention of the bore or mention of resubdivision. After a number of 
appeals the High Court found that the intention of the contract was clear and that “convincing 
proof” was required to maintain that the intention is other than what is clearly written in the 
contract. 
In Re Boundary of Jarwood Holding (1938) 17 QCLLR 63 the court was required to decide 
on a conflict, within a description of a lease, between a straight line between two surveyed 
points and description of that line as a watershed. The judge divined that the original 
intention of the Minister and the Governor in Council could be ascertained from documentary 
evidence tendered at the hearing because the position of the survey points was known at the 
time the leases were offered and the location of the watershed was not. 
If the intention of the parties is clear then the boundaries are clear. Likewise if the physical 
evidence of boundaries is in accord with the documentary evidence of the boundaries then 
there are no decisions for the cadastral surveyor to make. If however, the physical evidence is 
contradictory or it is not in agreement with the documentary evidence then the cadastral 
surveyor is obliged to decide which evidence gives the better indication of the expressed 
intention of the parties. There is a well used principle for the construction of deed. 
…that a grant ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties, and that 
where any doubt arises the deed ought to be construed more strongly as against the 
grantor. 
(Jaques v Doyle (1881) 2 NSWR 113 at 117) 
That is to say that since the person who is granting the land has the greater power and level of 
control then the onus is on them to exercise that control carefully. In the case where land is 
originally alienated it is clear who the grantor is. It is the Crown. As the judge said in an early 
South Australian case… 
… that is to say, the Crown, having received the purchaser’s money and put him into 
possession, cannot at its pleasure take from him this or that portion of the section and 
grant it to another. 
(Hutchison v Leeworthy (1860) 2 SALR 152 at 154)  
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However in the case of private subdivision of land where the land may be divided into lots 
and totally disposed of by the owner then the application of this principle is not so easy.  
  
All the cases and authorities agree that:  
The duty of the court is to interpret the instrument of application by ascertaining the 
intention of the parties, and for this purpose we must as far as possible put ourselves in 
the position at the time when the application was made and approved. 
(Phillips v The Crown  12 CLR 287 (1910) at 291) 
The task for the cadastral surveyor is to use evidence to divine the expressed intention of the 
parties that created the boundary. Before a cadastral surveyor can do this however they need 
to understand the weight that courts have given to different types of evidence over time.  
6. Donaldson v. Hemmant (1901) 11 QLJ 35 
In 1890 Hemmant sold a number of lots by public auction. The lots were all pegged by a 
surveyor prior to the auction and each of the pegs had been branded with the appropriate lot 
number.  At the sale, lithographic plans of the lots (much like sales plans you might get from 
a real estate agent today) were distributed prior to the start of the auction. Donaldson bid 
successfully for eight lots at the auction. He returned very soon after the sale, inspected the 
lots with the plan in hand and signed contracts for purchase of the eight lots. The contract 
allowed for a long time until final settlement and the final amounts were paid in 1897. When 
Donaldson proceeded to register the change of ownership into his name, his surveyor drew to 
his attention that the size and shape of the lots on the plan of survey was different from that 
shown on the lithograph. He accused Hemmant of fraud by moving the pegs and wished to 
rescind the contract, or alternatively, sought compensation as the area of land was less that 
that recorded on the lithograph. 
Notwithstanding the intricacies of each party’s actions, the closest to a definitive statement as 
to the court’s opinions on cadastral evidence was delivered by Griffith CJ in 1901. 
The object in cases of this kind is to interpret the instrument - that is, to ascertain the 
intent of the parties. The rule to find the intent is to give most effect to those things about 
which men are least liable to mistake. On this principle the things usually called for in a 
grant - that is, the things by which the land granted is described - have been thus 
marshalled in America: (1) The highest regard is had to natural boundaries. (2) To lines 
actually run and courses actually marked at the time of the grant. (3) If the lines and 
courses of an adjoining tract are called for, the lines will be extended to them, if they are 
sufficiently established, and no other departure from the deed is there by required, 
marked lines prevailing over those which are not marked. (4) To courses and distances, 
giving preference to the one or the other according to the circumstances. Words 
necessary to ascertain the premises must be retained, but words not necessary for the 
purpose may be rejected if inconsistent with the others. 
 (Donaldson v. Hemmant (1901) 11 QLJ 35 at p41) 
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Griffith CJ explicitly states that he is relying on the authority of American texts and decided 
cases. The next section is a discussion of the cases that, in part, gave rise to Griffith’s 
hierarchy with a focus on the reasons given for why these decisions were made. 
  
7. American cases prior to 1901 
Snow v Chapman ,1 Root 528 (1793) 
The defendant sold the plaintiff 110 acres of land that was described by reference to lines and 
bounds. It was later found that only 90 acres was contained within the description. The court 
found that the area between the bounds was conveyed not the 110 acres so the area should be 
disregarded.  
Howe v Bass, 2 Mass. 380 (1807) 
The land that was conveyed was described as having a 45 foot street frontage and being 
bound by ‘certain known and visible monuments’. It was found at a later date that the 
distance between the monuments was 65 feet. The court found that the monuments should be 
held over measurements. 
There is no rule of construction more established than this, that where a deed describes 
land by its admeasurement, and at the same time by known and visible monuments, these 
latter shall govern. And the rule is bottomed on the soundest reason. There may be 
mistakes in measuring land, but there can be none in monuments. When a party is 
about purchasing land, he naturally estimates its quantity, and of course its value, by 
the fences which enclose it, or by other fixed monuments which mark its boundaries, 
and he purchases accordingly. 
(Howe v Bass, 2 Mass. 380 (1807) at p383) 
This is a theme that reoccurs in many judgements. At its essence it is a consumer view of the 
lot. If the person is willing to buy what he or she sees around themselves then they should be 
satisfied with that. 
Preston' Heirs v Bowmar, 2 Bibb 493 (1811) 
The first two corners of the lot in question were reliably fixed but there was no physical 
evidence to indicate where the other two corners were. There was a misclose in the metes 
describing the lot. The court indicated that if the corners are not marked and bearings and 
distances do not agree then there is no universal rule which requires that either bearings or 
distances should be adopted. Rather those that fit best with the expressed intention of the 
parties to the boundary should be accepted.   
McIver's Lessee v. Walker, 9 Cranch ,13 U.S. 173 (1815) 
There was dispute as to whether the bearings shown on a plan attached to the patent refered 
to magnetic or true bearings. No field survey had been made, but the lots were shown as 
including a known creek. If the plan was laid out using magnetic bearings then the creek 
would not be included in the lot. The court found that attaching the plan as required by the 
state law was the same as including it in the patent and the bearings should be read as true 
because that was the only way the creek shown on the plan could be included in the lot.  
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As part of the judgement Marshall CJ of the US Supreme Court explained why the 
monuments should prevail over a written description when he said: 
But it is a general principle that the course and distance must yield to natural objects 
called for in the patent. All lands are supposed to be actually surveyed, and the intention 
of the grant is to convey the land according to that actual survey; consequently if marked 
trees and marked corners be found conformably to the calls of the patent, or if water-
courses be called for in the patent, or mountains or any other natural objects, distances 
must be lengthened or shortened, and courses varied so as to conform to those objects. 
The reason of the rule is, that it is the intention of the grant to convey the land actually 
surveyed, and mistakes in courses or distances, are more probable and more frequent, 
than in marked trees, mountains, rivers or other natural objects capable of being 
clearly designated and accurately described.  
(McIver's Lessee v. Walker 9 Cranch ,13 U.S. 173 (1815) at 178) 
Davis v Rainsford 17 Mass. 207 (1821) 
The judgement in this case conceded the most established principle is that known monuments 
must govern over bearings and distances. However the judge makes a exception due to the 
facts of the case. He states that the reason monuments control is because they are less liable 
to mistake, but then he applies the legal maxim cessante causa, cessat effectus, which 
translates as “the cause ceasing, the effect must cease.” The judge makes the point that the 
deed makes a distance as being 0.381 m (1’3”) whereas the monuments make the distance to 
be 1.067 m (3’6”) and concludes that no-one could make a 0.686 m error in a 1.067 m line. 
He maintains that there is no mistake (it was intended to be 0.381 m) so then there is no need 
for the rule (that monuments should govern). This distinction will be of use when we come to 
discuss the place of reference marks in reinstatement.  
The judgement makes another useful statement: 
When lines are laid down on a map or plan, and are referred to in a deed, the courses, 
distances, and other particulars appearing on such plan, are to be as much regarded as 
the true description of the land conveyed, as they would be, if expressly recited in the 
deed. This is a familiar rule of construction in all those cases, wherein no other 
description is given in the title-deeds, than the number of the lot on a surveyor's plan of a 
township or other large tract of land. 
(Davis v Rainsford 17 Mass. 207 (1821) at p3) 
This allows surveyors to make the connection between the way land is subdivided and 
conveyed in the United States at this time with the way it is conveyed in post-Torrens 
Australia. 
Fulwood v Graham, 1 Rich. 491 (1844)  
The judge in this case lists a hierarchy and makes an important qualification that will be 
mentioned repeatedly in reference to any hierarchy. 
They all maintain that in locating lands, we are to resort, 1st. To natural boundaries, 2d. 
To artificial marks, 3d. To adjacent boundaries, 4th. To course and distance; but it has 
never been said, that each of these occupied an inflexible position. It sometimes might 
occur, that an inferior means of location might control a higher, when it was plain there 
was a mistake. 
(Fulwood v Graham, 1 Rich. 491 (1844) at p3) 
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This is a critical point, the hierarchy is merely an indication and it should yield to the 
particulars of a case or survey. This is not a carte blanche for any surveyor to go straight to 
an ‘I reckon’ solution. But it does allow the surveyor flexibility for the situation where the 
application of a rigid hierarchy would result in a manifest idiocy being performed.  
Walsh v. Hill 38 Cal. 481 (1869) 
In Walsh v. Hill there was a conflict between a natural monument, the low water mark, and a 
number of artificial monuments. The judge repeats the maxim that “if there are conflicting 
calls, those which, from their nature, are less liable to mistake, must control those which are 
more liable to mistake” (p486 original emphasis) but goes on to point out that all the artificial 
monuments are consistent with each other and are consistent with the high water mark being 
the point of commencement. He takes a similar view to the Judge in Fulwood v Graham to 
allow common sense to be applied to the interpretation of deeds. 
… in the construction of written instruments, we have not derived much aid from the 
technical rules of the books. The only rule of much value – one that is frequently 
shadowed forth, but seldom, if ever, expressly stated in the books-- is to place ourselves 
as near as possible in the seats which were occupied by the parties at the time the 
instrument was executed: then taking it by its four corners, read it.  
(Walsh v Hill 38 Cal 481 (1869) at 487) 
8. Monuments  
Hallmann (1973) makes the point that the term monument, while used in judicial decisions 
and legal texts is rarely defined. He suggests that the vital requisite to convert some durable 
object into a boundary monument is that it be referred to in a document of title. This 
definition is later used in Registrar General v Tuckfield [1991] NSWLEC 121. Thanks to 
Davis v Rainsford surveyors are comfortable in considering a cadastral survey plan as an 
appropriate document. Brown (1980, p. 149) writes that monuments need to be visible, 
permanent, stable, certain of identity and independent of measurement.  
In Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co, 129 F. 668 (1904) the identity 
of the monument was of critical importance. A mark was found that did not agree with the 
written description and it was not found in the described position. The surveyor’s field notes 
described the monuments as square posts with figures carved into it. Several other 
monuments matching this description were found at other corners but at the corner in dispute 
a round stake with blaze in the side and pencil marks of the lot number was found 28 feet 
northwest of the corner as described by the bearings and distances. The judges agreed that if 
this mark was the original corner mark then it would control the boundary. The court was 
split as to whether this stake was the mark that was originally placed. The majority thought it 
should have been ignored and the dissenting judge thought the mark was placed by the 
original survey.  
Notwithstanding the judges opinion of where the stake had come from, all the judges agree 
that if a monument has been lost or removed and its original position can be shown by parol 
( i.e. oral) or other competent evidence then this location will prevail over dimensions. Where 
they differed was that the majority of the court thought that the evidence was not sufficient to 
substitute a different monument. 
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In cases of this character the original monuments called by the patent, if they still remain 
in place, prevail over the courses and distances noted in the description. If the 
monuments called have been lost or removed, the places where they were originally 
located may be shown by parol or other competent evidence, and, if proved to the 
satisfaction of the jury by a fair preponderance of evidence, these original locations will 
prevail over the courses and distances, and control the application of the description to 
the land. … If the monuments are lost or removed and their original locations are not 
established by competent proof, the courses and distances prevail, and control the 
description. 
(Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co, 129 F. 668 (1904) at 671) 
This idea of a chain of evidence was used in Mt Bischoff Tin Mining Co. v Mt Bischoff 
Extended (1913) 15 CLR 549. This case revolved about a boundary that separated two 
mining leases. The first lease had been created in 1874 and although it was not certain the 
judge found it probable that the lease had been surveyed and marked at that date. Ten years 
later a change in legislation gave an obligation to lessees to maintain posts and lockspits at 
their corners.  In 1891 a surveyor was employed to remark the leases. He found marks at the 
corner and renewed them. At the time of the conflict in 1913 the judge was satisfied that 
these marks marked the corner of the lease even though they were not physically the marks 
placed by the original surveyor.  Similarly in a decision from the NSW land and Environment 
Court (Registrar General v Tuckfield [1991] NSWLEC 121) the judge was quite prepared to 
accept a survey mark that had been lost but “re-established in a survey done by Mr Hogan's 
firm”. It would appear that knowledge of who, when and for what purpose a monument is 
placed is a decisive factor.  An original mark or monument in the legal sense need not be the 
mark first placed by the original surveyor but it is a mark of known origin.  
As to the recognition of monuments Turner v Hubner (1923) 24 SR 3 makes some useful 
remarks. 
Fences are the most unsatisfactory of monuments because they are not durable and are 
easily shifted. In the absence of some indication or evidence of identity it is a large 
assumption to make that a fence round an allotment in a plan of 1862 is identical with a 
fence shown round the same allotment in 1868 or 1874. They may be the same but if the 
measurements do not tally I do not think I am justified in coming to the conclusion that 
the fences must be identical and the measurements therefore wrong.  
(Turner v Hubner (1923) 24 SR 3 at p8) 
This should sound a word of warning as the same can be said of survey pegs. The judge 
makes the point that since the fence was shown in different positions by two surveys then it is 
a stretch to make the presumption that it is the same fence. It is reasonable to extend this 
reasoning to pegs. If the peg that is found conforms with neither dimensions nor other 
monuments then the surveyor may not necessarily be required to fix the boundary to the peg.  
9. Abuttals 
If  a boundary is a theoretical line that marks the limit of a parcel of land, then it is desirable 
that adjoining parcels have the same boundary, otherwise there would exist small strips of 
ownerless land or worse still strips of overlapping land that are in dispute.Where the 
dimensions on a plan would lead to a wrong inference as to the dimensions of the land, but 
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the abuttals are shown correctly, the owner is entitled to all the land which actual 
measurement on the ground would show to lie between those abuttals (Archard v. Ellerker 
(1888) 10 ALT 196). 
In Bank of Australasia v Attorney-General (1894) 15 NSWR 256 land had been granted by 
the Crown with four boundaries running in the cardinal directions. The northern and southern 
boundaries already existed. The grant was stated as being 660 acres but the area between the 
two known boundaries was approximately 1000 acres. The court found that the adjoining 
boundaries were sufficient to describe the land and the grantee was entitled to all that land 
between.   The judge said: 
The question of quantity is mere matter of description, if the boundaries are 
ascertained… 
 (Bank of Australasia v Attorney-General (1894) 15 NSWR 256 at 262) 
This was similar to the position the court found itself in Hutchison v Leeworthy (1860) 2 
SALR 152. The lot was described as being bounded by a river on two sides, a road and an 
existing lot. The plan showed the area as 134 acres but in reality it was closer to 190 acres. 
The action started when the Crown attempted to recover the difference of 56 acres and grant 
it to another person. The court found that the description of the land was unambiguous and 
the Crown could not grant what it no longer had. The judge makes the comment that it was 
not the purchaser’s fault that the survey was inaccurate. The judge went on to say that it made 
no difference as to how big the mistake was, but in some circumstances it may raise a 
question as to the intention. 
In Small v Glen (1880) 6 VLR 154 a lot was shown as bounded by three roads. The distance 
shown on the plan between two of the roads was shorter than true distance between the roads. 
The court decided that the dimension could be ignored by applying the principle falsa 
demonstratio non nocet. That is if part of a description is true and part false, if the true part 
describes the subject with sufficient certainty, the untrue part will be rejected or ignored 
(Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 1983). In this case if the distance was adopted the lot 
could not be unambiguously defined. The distance could be laid in from the first road and the 
lot not be bounded by the second road or the distance could be laid in from the second road 
and fall short of the first or the lot centre could be equidistant from each road and not be 
bounded by either.  However if the distance was ignored then the lot could unambiguously be 
bounded by all three roads. Therefore the distance was ignored as falsa demonstratio. 
The same type of reasoning was applied in Archard v Ellerker (1888) 10 ALT 196. A 
surveyor had been asked to prepare a plan which showed a lot as be 18’ wide and bounded on 
one side by a party wall. In fact the two sides of the lot were not parallel and the lot was 
0.115 m wider at the rear of the lot. While finding that the surveyor was negligent, the court 
found that the wrong dimension on the plan did not change the boundary and it was still the 
centre of the party wall. The original trial judge had made the point, when assessing 
damages,  that if the wall had been destroyed the plaintiff ran the risk of losing the area 
between plan boundary and the true boundary. 
The critical point when fixing boundaries by abuttals is the order in which the boundaries are 
created. The fact that one lot was in existence before the other was an important point in Mt 
Bischoff Tin Mining Co. v Mt Bischoff Extended (1913) 15 CLR 549. 
The plaintiff’s southern boundary, wherever that was, was the defendants’ northern 
boundary, which was, in 1891, eight years before the defendants’ title began, denoted by 
old marks on the ground and was then marked afresh. 
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(Mt Bischoff Tin Mining Co. v Mt Bischoff Extended (1913) 15 CLR 549 at 554) 
Likewise, in Stevens v Williams (1886) 12 VLR 152 Allotment 2 had been granted by a metes 
description that did not agree with position of the boundary of Allotment 1 which had been 
granted previously. The judge said: 
…the defendant has shown that the land in dispute has been already conveyed to her by a 
certificate of title at least as equally conclusive with that of the plaintiff. 
(Stevens v Williams (1886) 12 VLR 152 at 158) 
The Crown could not convey land to another person after it had already conveyed to someone 
previously nor could plans for adjoiners that come after the original necessarily control. 
A man’s title to land is not to be placed in jeopardy by hearsay evidence as to what some 
surveyor may have done or placed upon record in the shape of a map  …a man’s title to 
land is not to be affected by some description contained in a deed or grant to which he is 
no way privy, and of a date subsequent to the grant under which he holds the land. 
(Smith v Neild (1889) 10 NSWR 171 at 174) 
10. Occupation 
With respect to evidence provided by the owner's occupation of a lot the most commonly 
cited case is Equitable Building and Investment Co. v Ross (1886) NZLR 5SC 229 which is 
often referred to as the Lambton Quay Case.  The parties contended over an encroachment in 
an area where the surveyed boundaries were unclear because there were no original survey 
marks.  
Where there are no natural boundaries, and the original survey-marks are gone, and 
there is no great difference in admeasurement, a long occupation originally authorised 
by the proper public authority, and acquiesced in throughout the period by the 
surrounding owners, is evidence of a convincing nature that the land so occupied is that 
which the deed conveys.  Even where monuments exist which enable a more accurate 
survey to be made, no trifling discrepancy can be allowed to over-rule the practical 
interpretation put upon the instrument by such an occupation.  The occupier is not to be 
driven to rely on a mere possessory title; but has a right to assert that the land he holds is 
the very land granted. 
(Equitable Building and Investment Co. v Ross (1886) NZLR 5SC 229 at 234) 
Australian courts have also considered the status of occupation. Attorney-General v Nicholas 
[1927] GLR 340, commenting on the Lambton Quay Case, considered that whether or not the 
Local Authority authorised the occupation was irrelevant. National Trustees Etc. Co. v 
Hassett [1907] VLR 404 made the point that in the absence of survey marks there can be no 
better indication of the land to which the grant relates than long and unchallenged occupation 
but it does not rely on adverse possession, the fence shows where the original boundary was. 
In Turner v. Myerson (1917) 18 SR (NSW) 133 the judge was critical of the fact that the 
NSW legislation did not allow any possessory title. Perhaps it was this preference that led 
him to say: 
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Where possession of land, purporting to be occupation of the land described in a 
certificate of title as a lot on a deposited plan, has been uninterrupted for 30 years, the 
most positive evidence is required to rebut the presumption that the land as occupied is 
in accordance with the boundaries as originally plotted. 
(Turner v. Myerson (1917) 18 SR (NSW) 133 at 135) 
The judge conceded that occupation as evidence relies on its connection to the original survey 
but he thought that surveyors could not be certain enough to show an encroachment in this 
case.  
This idea of a connection to the original survey may have meant that the court in Cable v. 
Roche (1961) NZLR 614 took particular note of the phrase ‘there is no great difference in 
admeasurement’ to rule that the position of the occupation in question in that action was too 
different to the boundary position as described by the plan to be considered evidence of that 
boundary.  
Occupation simpliciter may be taken as sufficient in the absence of good evidence 
countervailing it, but mere proof of long and uncontested occupation does not relieve the 
Court of the duty of inquiry and of considering the history of the property and the 
technical evidence bearing on the dispute. 
(Cable v. Roche (1961) NZLR 614 at 616) 
Turner v Hubner (1923) 24 SR 3 found that if the dimensions of the occupation did not tally 
with the dimensions of the plan then the surveyor was justified in coming to the conclusion 
that the fence was not the original and so it could be disregarded. These cases reasoned that to 
be evidence of the original survey that occupation should reflect that survey and that 
occupation that differed greatly from the expected position may be disregarded. Obviously 
there can be no absolute value of disparity but it must reflect the age of the original survey 
and the consistency of the other evidence. 
Cases have taken into consideration the type of occupation when assessing its usefulness as 
evidence of the boundary. As discussed in the section on monuments, Turner v Hubner found 
that fences were unsatisfactory because they were not durable and were easily shifted. In 
addition it would be reasonable to assume that people would take more care in erecting an 
object that would take more time and money to remove if it was found to be in the incorrect 
position. Considering these reasons it is clear that a surveyor is entitled to consider that 
buildings are preferable to fences as occupation evidence. The method of construction of the 
occupation was in question in Attorney-General v Nicholas [1927] GLR 340 the judge 
considered it significant that the fence in dispute had no ditch beside it like the other 
boundary fences in the area and so decided that it was not intended to mark the boundary. In 
James v Stevenson [1893] AC 162 a fence that had been in position for upwards of forty 
years was accepted as “no legal origin can be shewn to this fence, except the boundary drawn 
by the release of 1839” (at p166). The fact that this fence had been erected in “1839, or very 
soon after”  led the court to the compelling presumption in favour of the fence being on the 
line intended to be the boundary.  
Like NSW at the time of Turner v. Myerson (1917) 18 SR (NSW) 133 Queensland has no 
title by occupation for part of a lot. In other words the fact that the fence has been there for a 
long time does not shift the boundary. Surveyors should be careful when using other 
jurisdictions to interpret how occupation can be used.  In some jurisdictions it is possible to 
fix a boundary by agreement if the boundary has been lost, but in the United States Myrick v 
Peet 56 Mont. 13, 180 (1919) made the point that no valid agreement could be made if the 
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original monuments could be shown to be in place. Similarly, in Canada cases like Thelland 
v. Golden Haulage Ltd., [1989] O.J. No. 2303 (Dist. Ct.) and Nicholson v. Halliday, [2005] 
O.J. No. 57 it would appear at first impression that the fence was being adopted even though 
it was in a considerably different position to that shown on the plan. A careful reading will 
show that the practice in very early cadastral surveys in Canada was to monument the corners 
of the lot but not run the lines. In these cases the courts point out that it is not necessary for 
the boundary to be first run by a surveyor and the occupants when constructing the fence 
were the first people to run the line. In this case the fence has attained the status of lines 
actually run in Brown’s hierarchy. 
11. Area 
Many cases have explicitly stated the reported area of the lot is to rank lowly as evidence of 
the boundary location. However in some notable cases it has been area that has been 
considered the decisive fact over which the case has been decided. The court in Watcham v. 
East Africa Protectorate [1919] AC 533 used the granted area as a way to pick between two 
different constructions of a deed where it was doubtful where the deed intended the 
boundaries should run. In the South African case of Horne v Struben [1902] AC 454 the 
judge comments that because the boundary position put forward by the respondent Struben 
meant that he was in fact receiving considerably less land than the boundary preferred by the 
Surveyor General Horne. The judge believed that this told in the respondent’s favour. It is 
also interesting to note that the judge considered the probability that the river was the true 
boundary was increased by the fact that the property could be profitably occupied if it had 
access to fresh water. 
12. Sundry cases 
This following are decisions or aspects of decisions that cannot be neatly categorised but are 
still worthy of note. 
In Mt Bischoff Tin Mining Co. v Mt Bischoff Extended (1913) 15 CLR 549 the judge make the 
comment that it made no difference to the case that fact that the land in dispute was Crown 
land.  
…it must be assumed, from the nature of the occupation, the requirements of the 
regulations and the length of time, with the knowledge and permission of the Crown; and 
so, whatever may be the law as to a mere intruder, the plaintiffs' position here is as 
strong as if the land were private property.  
(Mt Bischoff Tin Mining Co. v Mt Bischoff Extended (1913) 15 CLR at 563) 
It is then reasonable to assume that all the previous discussion about evidence is equally valid 
to road boundaries and where the lot abuts unallocated state land (USL).  
In National Trustees Etc. Co. v Hassett [1907] VLR 404 the best evidence for the boundary 
was found to be a fence. However the boundary was shown as straight on the plan but the 
fence was not straight. In finding the fence as the boundary the judge said: 
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…these old surveys are just as likely to be wrong in respect of a want of straightness of 
boundaries intended to be straight as in any other respect. 
(National Trustees Etc. Co. v Hassett [1907] VLR 404 at 413) 
The judge appears to have based his comment on the fact that distances were step chained. 
Our knowledge of the way surveys were done as described in SVY3304 means we might take 
this statement with a grain of salt. However in hilly country a surveyor may well be justified 
in bending a straight line if it is not possible to see from one corner to the other. 
Perhaps the most celebrated boundary dispute in Australia was South Australia v Victoria 
(1914) AC 283. In 1836 letters patent created the Province of South Australia and made its 
boundary with NSW to be the 141º line of longitude. In 1845 both colonies agreed to mark 
the line from the ocean, north to the River Murray. When this line was finally marked on the 
ground both colonies issued proclamations adopting the line as the border. In truth, the 
longitude observations by the surveyor were subject to error in the method of determination 
and the line marked was 2½ miles further west than the 141º line of longitude. The Privy 
Council rejected the idea that the boundary’s position on the earth would be subject to the 
accuracy of the determination methods. It said that for the sake of jurisdictional certainty it 
had to be fixed on the earth, and since the original survey was publically agreed to by NSW 
and South Australia then it should form the boundary. Since NSW could only create Victoria 
from its own territory then by implication the boundary became the Victorian – South 
Australian border as well. When the boundary was marked north from the Murray River later 
new technology allowed a more accurate fixation and the 2½ mile step can still be seen in the 
boundary.   
13. Revisiting Brown’s hierarchy 
At the start of this paper the evidence hierarchy published by Alan Brown in 1980 was 
quoted. It is useful to revisit the hierarchy in the light of some of the other decisions that have 
been discussed in this paper. 
Firstly, it is reasonable to rely on the authority of Davis v Rainsford 17 Mass. 207 (1821) to 
substitute of the cadastral survey plan for mentions of the deed. 
The initial statement that the greatest weight should be given to lines actually marked on the 
ground is fundamentally sound. However it is clear from decisions in Donaldson v Hemmant 
(1901) 11 QLJ 35, Howe v Bass, 2 Mass. 380 (1807), McIver's Lessee v. Walker, 13 U.S. 173 
(1815) and Mt Bischoff Tin Mining Co. v Mt Bischoff Extended (1913) 15 CLR 549 that the 
corners that mark the termini of lines have been equally well thought of. Resurrection Gold 
Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co, 129 F. 668 (1904) showed the court’s uncertainty in 
dealing with the origin of the marks. A line is in some ways self corroborating because if one 
point is moved or disturbed then the line is no longer straight. Courts have been happy to take 
corner information when they are certain the marks are those placed by the original surveyor 
and the marks are in the same place.   
Natural monuments clearly should be shown next. 
Stevens v Williams (1886) 12 VLR 152 and Smith v Neild (1889) 10 NSWR 171 both argue 
for a distinction to be made in the case of adjoiners. There are valid practical reasons why 
adjoiners should be allowed to be used as a way of ensuring a ‘seamless’ cadastre, but both of 
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these cases make it clear that what happens before the grant in question should be given a 
higher status than that which happens after.  
Evidence of occupation has been used many times in cases to resolve the boundary position. 
Sometimes it has been done with reservation. However courts have indicated the qualities 
that make the good occupation evidence. That is, it should be contemporary with the 
boundary creation (Attorney-General v Nicholas [1927] GLR 340 and James v 
Stevenson [1893] AC 162) and that it should be more or less in the boundary position shown 
by the plan (Equitable Building and Investment Co. v Ross (1886) NZLR 5SC 229, Cable v 
Roche (1961) NZLR 614, Registrar General v Tuckfield [1991] NSWLEC 121 and Turner v 
Hubner (1923) 24 SR 3). 
Maps and plans in the Australian context are really indistinguishable from bearings and 
distances. With the exceptions of showing bounds by adjoiners and natural monuments the 
plans consist of bearings and distances. The maxim relied upon in Davis v Rainsford 17 
Mass. 207 (1821), cessante causa, cessat effectus is very useful to consider in regards to 
recovery marks. Providing the connection to the corner is not of an excessive distance then 
surveyors should be able to rely on this maxim to support using a previously measured 
connection bearing and distance in preference to a longer boundary bearing and distance that 
may have been surveyed by the same surveyor at the same time.  
To reflect the court’s concern in Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co, 
129 F. 668 (1904) and its reservation about fences in Turner v Hubner (1923) 24 SR 3 some 
mention should be made about genuine cadastral evidence in extraordinary positions. Some 
weight should be attached that to the fact that an uncorroborated peg or recovery mark is just 
as likely if not more likely to have been moved or disturbed than to have been placed in the 
‘wrong’ position by the original surveyor. 
As before, area should be considered the least evidence as expressly stated in Snow v 
Chapman, 1 Root 528 (1793), Melville-Smith v Attorney-General [1996] 1 NZLR 596 and 
Bank of Australasia v Attorney-General (1894) 15 NSWR 256.  
Likewise, the caveat mentioned in Brown’s last point will always be appropriate when 
consider a rules based approach.  
1. The greatest weight must always be given to lines and corners marked on the ground and 
corroborated by other physical evidence. 
2. Natural monuments shown on the plan. 
3. Adjoiners – “a well established line of adjacent survey” in existence before the original 
grant. 
4. Adjoiners created after the original grant. 
5. Artificial monuments corroborated by documentary evidence. 
6. Occupation evidence that is contemporaneous and consistent with the documentary 
evidence. 
7. Bearings and distances. Bearings and distances of short lines will over-ride bearings and 
distances of longer lines. Neither bearing nor distance is given overall preference. 
8. Artificial monuments uncorroborated by documentary or physical evidence. 
9. Area … will in general be the least valued evidence, but may in some cases be the key to 
the problem. 
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10. Finally, but most important of all, any one of these rules may be of more (or less) weight 
in one case than another. The rules set out are for cases of conflict, they are general rules, 
to be used as a guide but not as a straightjacket.   
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